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ABSTRACT
This paper surveys recent research on the concept of a dominant
product design. The point of departure for the survey is the idea that
dominant designs occur which shift the terms of competition in an
industry. A dominant design is defined as a specific path along a
design hierarchy, which establishes primacy among competing design
paths. The way in which this might occur and its implications for
innovation and competition are then explored. Evidence from the
literature covering a number of industries in the United States is then
surveyed and compared with original evidence, first presented here,
from some of the same industries in Japan. The dominant design
which emerges in each industry is not necessarily the result solely of
technical potentials, but also of timing, collateral assets, and other
circumstances. In several cases dominant designs have not or have not
yet occurred. Once a degree of standardization is accepted, major
innovations in an industry seem less and less likely to occur short of a
wave of new entrants and increasing competition. In contrast, entry
and innovation in Japan seem to occur following appearance of the
dominant design, and implies that firms can pursue widely different
strategies so long as their strategy is linked to the state of evolution of
their core technology. Implications for further research are discussed,
and the idea that a dominant design is related to information
economies for users is introduced. Thus, for a design to be dominant
or a standard requires a degree of experimentation and a rich
collaboration between producers and users, not simply a synthesis of
parts and functions in a product.
Schumpeter considered innovation both the creator and destroyer of
corporations and entire industries. Cristiano Antonelli, Pascal Petit and
Gabriel Tahar (1992) note that in his early works Schumpeter (1912) insisted
on the role of entrepreneurs in seizing discontinuous opportunities to
innovate. This initial approach they continue, stressed the discontinuities of
the innovation process. In later years Schumpeter (1942) began to place
greater stress on the role of larger enterprises in innovation, seeming to
believe that as scientific knowledge accumulated there was a threshold
investment in R & D below which a firm could not be an effective player.
The writers have always been troubled by this conflict in Schumpeter's views.
The present analysis suggests that the former hypothesis is true for areas of
emerging product technology and firms involved in product innovation,
especially for assembled products, that is for what Abernathy and Utterback
(1975 and 1978) termed discontinuous and fluid phases, while the latter
hypothesis might well hold for process innovation and for many non-
assembled products, and for firms producing standard products and large
systems (which the above mentioned authors termed the specific phase).
In earlier work Utterback and Abernathy (1975) introduced the concept
of a dominant product design and suggested that the occurrence of a
dominant design may alter the character of innovation and competition in a
firm and an industry. A dominant design usually takes the form of a new
product (or set of features) synthesized from individual technological
innovations introduced independently in prior product variants.
We believe that a firm's probability of surviving through time will be
directly affected by a firm's entry timing vis a vis the evolution of technology
in the industry (Suarez and Utterback 1993). In particular, we hypothesize
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that the probability of survival will tend to be greater for firms entering the
industry before the emergence of a dominant design than for firms entering
after it. The period following the dominant design will be marked by a wave
of exiting firms made up of both early entrants not able to master all aspects of
the technology and those firms unlucky enough to enter following the
dominant design as well. The development by incumbents of collateral assets
and economies of scale (due to increased production after a dominant design)
will represent significant barriers to entry for firms that venture to enter the
industry after a dominant design. Moreover, strong patent positions may
have been established by earlier entering firms that are difficult for later
entrants to completely circumvent.
An alternative hypothesis would be that firms entering before a
dominant design is established will have lower chances for survival. While
firms entering after a dominant design is established face difficulties as late
entrants in overcoming entry barriers, firms entering before will face a high
chance of choosing the wrong design. Why do we suppose that firms
entering during a period of experimentation will do better than those which
enter after a commercially successful design has emerged? What are the
circumstances under which early entry will be easier, and what are those
which might auger against our hypothesis?
In this chapter we intend to explore the questions above by looking at a
series of examples arrayed over the past century. These include typewriters,
the automobile, television sets and picture tubes, transistors, integrated
circuits, calculators disc drives and supercomputers. Data on industry
participation and parallel data on technological change over the full course of
an industry's development have been difficult to obtain. Thus, although our
sample is not balanced or weighted in any scientific sense, it consists of the
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most complete sets of data that we have so far been able to discover or
synthesize. More fragmentary data from other industries will be used to
illustrate particular points. The data available do convincingly point to the
fact that a dominant design and product standardization mark a watershed in
industry structure and competition in each case examined.
WHAT IS A DOMINANT DESIGN?
The point of departure for our work is the idea that dominant designs
occur which shift the terms of competition in an industry. A dominant
design is a specific path, along an industry's design hierarchy, which
establishes dominance among competing design paths (Utterback and Sudrez
1992. See Figure 1 for an illustration of a design hierarchy). Recall from Clark
(1985) that design trajectories and paths are influenced by both technical and
market factors. For the purposes of this chapter, we define the occurrence of a
dominant design in a given industry based on the knowledge of industry
experts. Industry experts were given a rough idea of the general model
proposed here and--without seeing our data--they identified a design they
considered the dominant one in the industry. They were also asked about the
date on which that design was introduced in the market. We further checked
the date given against documentary evidence.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
A dominant design will embody the requirements of many classes of
users of a particular product, even though it may not meet the needs of a
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particular class to quite the same extent as would a customized design. Nor is
a dominant design necessarily the one which embodies the most extreme
technical performance. A dominant design will, however, represent a
milestone or transition point in the life of an industry. Table 1 provides the
sources from which we have identified and surmised dates of the dominant
designs for each industry considered in this paper.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Dominant designs often have the result of drastically reducing the
number of performance requirements to be met by a product by making many
features implicit. Thus, few today would ask if a car had a self starter or
whether a typewriter could produce upper and lower case letters, though
these were features in pre-dominant design models. That dominant designs
are not necessarily predetermined is easily illustrated by considering that the
standard keyboard was designed to minimize the interference of mechanical
typewriter keys, or by considering Sony's challenge to the RCA devised
television tube. A dominant design is generally the product of the
experiments, technical possibilities, choices and proprietary positions of its
day. Equally, the persistence of the older designs mentioned illustrates the
momentum of both established practice and complementary assets such as
typing skills and training. Once such a design is accepted it can have a
profound impact on both the direction of further technical advance, on the
rate of that advance, and on industry structure and competition.
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HOW DOES A DOMINANT DESIGN OCCUR?
How does technology evolve so that a given design becomes the
dominant one? Prior to the appearance of a dominant design many of its
separate features may be tried in varied products which are either custom
designed or designed for a particular and demanding market niche. The
turbulent competitive process through which many firms enter and some
leave an industry may be seen as a process of experimentation, with each
product introduction viewed as a new experiment on user preference (Klein
1977). This period has been called the fluid period of the industry (Abernathy
and Utterback 1978). During this period performance dimensions will tend to
be many and highly varied and can often be incommensurate. As a product
evolves certain features will be incorporated, subsuming the related
performance dimensions into the design. With the appearance of the
dominant design the product can be described by a few related and measurable
dimensions. A dominant design then, is synthesized from more fragmented
technological innovations introduced independently in prior products and
tested and often modified by users of those prior products. Following the
appearance of a dominant design the industry enters the more orderly period
characterized by a few large competitors and stable market shares that
Abernathy and Utterback termed the specific period or phase.
A few examples may help clarify this idea. Early versions of the
typewriter were able to produce only capital letters. The addition of lower
case letters and a shift key was at first a specialized feature. Numbers and
tabulation were similarly derived. The earliest typewriters marked on a paper
held inside the machine. "Visible typing," with the paper in view of the
operator, similarly began as an attraction of just a few models. These features
were later synthesized in the Underwood Model 5, which was to become the
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exemplar of the dominant typewriter design in 1906. Who today could
imagine typing without seeing the text, easily shifting to capital letters, or
easily entering numbers and aligning columns? These are no longer serious
issues or advertised as advantages of one or another manufacturer's product.
They are subsumed within the dominant design established by Underwood.
(The typewriter industry will be discussed in more detail below.) Yet within
recent memory the Apple II personal computer produced only 40 columns of
capital letters. The ability to use 80 columns, to type in upper and lower case
or to add a numeric keypad were all features to be purchased from different
vendors and installed by the proud owner! Users of even large computer
systems patiently embedded control characters in the text of various editing
and word processing programs until the innovation of the WYSIWYG (what
you see is what you get) display at Xerox PARC (Palo Alto Research Center),
later adopted in the Apple Macintosh, allowed users to easily change type
styles and sizes in a fascinating analogy with visible typing.
The process of experimentation that leads to the emergence of a
dominant design is not only a technological process. In fact, the emergence of
a dominant design is the result of a fortunate combination of technological,
economic, organizational, and inter-organizational factors. The process of
experimentation described above is overall a learning process. In reality,
there is technological, market, and organizational learning involved.
Commenting on one of our previous papers, Langlois writes, "the firm must
not only learn about what will work technologically but also about what
consumers want." Thus, factors other than technology also come into play.
We have identified several non-technology factors that have a critical effect
on the emergence of a dominant design:
* possession of collateral assets
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* industry regulation and government intervention
* strategic maneuvering at the firm level
* existence of bandwagon effects or network externalities in the industry
* management of the user-producer connection.
Collateral assets (Teece 1986) have a reinforcing-loop relationship with
dominant designs. These assets may help a firm to impose its design as the
dominant one and, in turn, the possession of a dominant product often helps
a firm accumulate collateral assets at a higher pace than before (SuArez and
Utterback 1992). Industry regulation (and other forms of government
intervention, such as large purchases) have the power to literally enforce a
given design as the dominant one, as with the RCA TV broadcast standard.
The strategy followed by the competing firms may also help determine the
dominant design, as shown by research on the VCR industry (Cusumano,
Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom 1991). The existence of a bandwagon effect or
network externalitiesl in an industry often prompts and accelerates the
emergence of a dominant design. In cases like this, firms which are able to
achieve larger scale more quickly than their competitors may have a better
chance of winning the race to settle the dominant product.
Finally, the way each firm manages its user interface may have a
significant effect on a firm's ability to impose a dominant design. We said
above that a dominant design is partly the result of market learning.
Therefore, close contact with users during the early period of experimentation
will help firms determine which product features consumers look for, so that
they can include those features in their designs. Managing the user interface
in the search for a dominant design may take the form of especially close
relationships with "lead users" (von Hippel 1988), close interaction with
users' associations or interest groups, etc.
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HYPOTHESES
The Period Around the Dominant Design
We suggest that the emergence of a dominant design (via the creative
synthesis of a new product innovation or the effect of some of the factors
described above) results in a temporary monopoly situation, high unit profit
margins and prices, and sales of the dominant design in those few market
niches where it possesses the greatest performance advantage over other
competing alternatives. This is in line with Schumpeter's pathbreaking
"creative destruction" model and subsequent studies on the economics of
innovation (Schumpeter 1939, Freeman 1986). As volume of production and
demand grows, and as a wider variety of applications is opened for the
innovation, many new firms will enter the market with diverse variations of
the product. For example, early versions of the automobile included steam
and electric vehicles as well as the now familiar internal-combustion engine.
It is common to think of new, innovative entrants as being small firms. We
do not agree entirely with the idea that only small firms can be innovative in
a young industry. Instead of focusing on firm size, we contend that
innovative firms often come from outside the industry in question (this
argument is in line with the earlier work of Gilfillan 1935 and Sch6n 1966).
The appearance of a dominant design shifts the competitive emphasis
to favor those firms, large or small, which are able to achieve greater skills in
process innovation and process integration, and with more highly developed
internal technical and engineering skills. We hypothesize that the peak of
the total population curve for any industry manufacturing assembled
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products in the United States will occur around the year in which a dominant
design emerges in that industry. 2 A dominant design has the effect of
enforcing standardization so that production economies can be sought.
Effective competition can then take place on the basis of cost as well as
product performance (Utterback and Abernathy 1975). The emergence of a
dominant design will mark the beginning of a shake-out period in an
industry (as we will see in the data presented below). Firms that are not able
to make the transition toward greater product standardization and process
innovation will be unable to compete effectively and will eventually fail.
Others may possess special resources and thus successfully merge with the
ultimately dominant firms. Some weaker firms may merge and still fail.
Overall, a firm's inability to change its organization structure and practices
along with the evolution of technology in the industry will be a major source
of failure.
The Post-Dominant Design Period
Eventually, the market reaches a point of stability in which there are
only a few large firms having standardized or slightly differentiated products
and relatively stable sales and market shares, until a major technological
discontinuity occurs and starts a new cycle again.3 During the period of
stability, a few small firms may remain in the industry, serving specialized
market segments, but, as opposed to the small firms entering special segments
early in the industry, they have little growth potential. Thus, it is important
to distinguish between merely small firms and small firms which are new
entrants, and to keep in mind that the term new entrants includes existing
firms (large or small) moving from their established market or technological
base into a new product area.
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It is only after a dominant design is established that economies of scale
can come in to play with powerful effect, leading to rapid growth of those
firms which most competently master the development of products based on
the dominant design, to the detriment of those firms which are slower to
adapt. Prior to the appearance of a dominant design economies of scale will
have little effect, because a large number of variants of a product will be
produced by the many competing entrants in an industry with each
producing at relatively small scale. Thus, we propose that economies of scale
are of primary importance after a dominant design is in place. In other
words, traditional economic assumptions about economies of scale are much
more appropriate to the period following a dominant design than to the
period of experimentation and creative turbulence which precedes it.4
A hallmark of stability is a concerted drive among the surviving firms
toward tightening their control over the value chain. This process can take
one or both of the following forms: (1) an improvement in relationships with
suppliers and distributors toward a more integrated and cooperative
relationship; and (2) the pursuit of vertical integration, i.e. direct ownership
of the different stages in the value chain.
Earlier versions of the model presented here (e.g. Abernathy and
Utterback 1978) considered vertical integration during the period of stability as
an inevitable outcome of technological evolution in an industry. Here, we
claim that what surviving firms really seek is "control over the value chain."
Vertical integration is but one possibility to achieve such control. Today
firms are increasingly relying on improved supplier and distributor
relationships to achieve control over the value chain (Piore and Sabel 1984,
Florida and Kenney 1989, Aoki 1984). The emergence of a set of more or less
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captive suppliers of equipment and components linked to a large firm is
commonplace. Although closer relationships with distributors may have
similar benefits, most of the literature has focussed on supplier relationships,
particularly on describing the Asian (mostly Japanese) model. Indeed, the
level of cooperation achieved by Asian firms and their suppliers is so high,
that often technical teams from the parent firm work at a supplier's site for
extended periods of time, solving a specific production problem (Cusumano
1985, Amsden 1989). Suppliers are often invited by the parent company to
participate in the design of a new product from its outset (Dertouzos, et al.
1989, Clark and Fujimoto 1991).
Suppliers may play a creative role if the parent firm is able to generate
enough loyalty and cooperation. Indeed, such a close relationship suggests
that we should probably re-think our very concept of a firm and its
boundaries. Only when relationships with suppliers are not cooperative
enough will there be a drive among producing firms to capture those
elements of supply which create the greatest uncertainties for them--i.e. a
drive toward vertical integration.
Timing of Entry and Dominant Designs
The implications of our framework point to the hypothesis that
entering before a dominant design emerges is the most viable strategy for a
firm. As Suarez and Utterback (1992) show, the hazard profile (the
instantaneous probability of failure) goes up for firms entering after the
dominant design. After a dominant design emerges, each year it gets more
difficult for new entrants to survive. As the above discussion implies, this.is
due to the fact that after a design has achieved dominance, firms which
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master that design will increasingly grow in volume, gain market share, build
up collateral assets, exploit economies of scale, and obtain name recognition
among customers. All of these points become high barriers that post-
dominant design entrants have to overcome if they want to succeed.
Early, pre-dominant design entrants often become the industry leaders.
It is each wave of radical, or architectural (Abernathy and Clark 1985) product
change that brings with it the entry'of new firms-either small, technology-
based enterprises or large firms carrying their technical skills into the new
product and market area, and it is these firms which later dominate the
restructured industry. For example, carbon filament incandescent lamps
replaced gas lighting; they themselves were replaced by metal filament
incandescent and later by fluorescent lighting. The Edison Company and the
Swan Lamp Company were the innovators in carbon filament lamps, but
only an insurmountable patent position allowed Edison to overcome new
firms which adopted metal filaments earlier than it did. Sylvania in the
United States was the first to innovate with fluorescent lighting. It
multiplied its market share by four-fold at General Electric's expense.
Harvested, naturally formed ice for refrigeration was replaced by machine-
made ice and later by mechanical refrigeration; it was not the ice harvesting
companies which innovated in mechanical means of ice production, nor was
it the companies producing ice and ice boxes which innovated in the area of
electro-mechanical refrigeration. In the 20 years from 1889 to 1909, Eastman-
Kodak's share of the U.S. photographic market went from 16% to 43% at the
expense of much larger competitors, because of its innovation of celluloid roll
film, while its competitors continuously improved glass plate photographic
techniques (Utterback 1994).
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RELATED RESEARCH SUPPORTING OUR PREDICTIONS
Mueller and Tilton (1969) were among the first to present an
hypothesis similar to ours. They contend that a new industry is created by the
occurrence of a major process or product innovation and develops
technologically as less radical innovations are introduced. They further argue
that the large corporation seldom provides its people with incentives to
initiate a development of radical importance. Thus, these changes tend to be
developed by new entrants without an established stake in a product market
segment. In their words, neither large absolute size nor market power appear
to be a necessary condition for successful development of most major
innovations.
Mueller and Tilton contend that once a major innovation is
established, there will be a rush of firms entering the newly formed industry,
or adopting a new process innovation. They hold that during the early
period of entry and experimentation immediately following a major
innovation, the science and technology upon which it depends is often only
crudely understood, and that this reduces the advantage of large firms over
others. However, the authors suggest that as the number of firms entering
the industry increases and more and more research and development (R&D)
is undertaken on the innovation, research becomes increasingly specialized
and innovations tend to focus on improvements in small elements of the
technology. This clearly works to the advantage of larger firms in the
expanding industry and to the disadvantage of smaller entrants. Product
differentiation will be increasingly centered around the technical strengths
and R&D organization of the existing firms. Strong patent positions may
have been established by earlier entering firms that are difficult for later
entrants to completely circumvent.
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Burton Klein (1977) suggests a profound connection between industry
structure and technological change in his seminal work on dynamic
economics. Klein portrays each firm's investments and product
introductions as experiments which provide corrective and stimulating
feedback to that firm and to the industry about product and market
requirements. Thus, the earliest period in the development of a product line
or industry, in which few firms participate, would necessarily be a period of
relatively slow technical progress and productivity advance. As larger
numbers of firms enter the arena, thus broadening the range of
experimentation and the definition of the product technology, Klein expects
greater innovation with correspondingly greater technological progress and
productivity advance. Finally, as a few firms come to dominate the industry
due to superior product technology and productivity, both experimentation
and progress will slow. Renewal or broadening of competition would
seemingly be required for more rapid progress to recur. In reviewing earlier
work Klein finds no case in which a major advance, one which established a
new and more rapid trajectory for technological progress, came from a major
firm in the industry in question. From this evidence he concludes that the
process of moving from a dynamic organization to a static one, of going from
a period of rapid organizational learning to a period of slow or no progress,
appears to be highly irreversible.
Some economists interested in technological innovation have
proposed models that parallel many of the features of our model. Gort and
Klepper (1982) present a five-stage product life cycle model which they then
contrast with data on 46 industries. The implications of their model for
industry structure over time anticipate ours. Klepper and Graddy (1990)
present an analytical model that attempts to capture the main "regularities"
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discussed in Gort and Klepper 1982. Gort and Konakayama (1982) estimate
probabilities of entry and exit based on a logistic model. Although important
contributions bridging economics and the management of technology, these
studies omit important insights coming from a deeper understanding of an
industry's technological evolution. For instance, the data on innovations are
not divided between product and process innovation, and thus do not allow
the authors to test whether the locus of innovation changes over time. The
identification of each stage in prior studies is basically done by looking at the
net entry data itself. The work presented here attempts to isolate the
identification the different stages from the industry's net entry data by
examining the evolution of technology through independent sources. The
emergence of a dominant design, for instance, is seen as an unequivocal sign
that a new stage has begun.
LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS
There are several instances in which the propositions put forward in
this chapter loose some or all their validity. The idea of a dominant design
does not seem to hold in industries producing non-assembled products such
as rayon, glass, pulp and paper, metals, or industrial gases. It may be that in
such cases a similar coalescence of technology around "enabling processes"
may occur such as the Float Glass process or medium consistency pulping
(Utterback and Nolet 1978, Anderson and Tushman 1990). Cases such as
integrated circuits or photographic film may be difficult to classify, and may
share some characteristics of both assembled and non-assembled products.
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Because non-assembled products contain a smaller number of different
materials than assembled products, there is a more concentrated focus of
technological effort and experimentation in the production process, which
goes through similar periods of variation and experimentation, resulting in
what might be called an enabling technology. This enabling technology
incorporates many of the elements needed in a continuous production
process and allows the focus of technological effort to shift to process
improvement rather than process innovation and design. This means that
firms producing non-assembled products may be less vulnerable to imitation
and international competition. Indeed, the chemical industry remains one of
the strongest exporters in the United States, though other reasons such as its
strong science base and relative lack of government participation in research
may be more influential factors. Much work remains to be done to begin to
understand these striking differences.
Another instance where our model should be viewed with caution is
when network externalities exist. For cases in which there are strong network
externalities, we do not expect the above arguments to completely apply.
Langlois (1991) argues that in the case of the IBM personal computer, for
example, the dominance of a standard increased entry in the industry, since
makers of clones could enter without the investment needed to insure
adequate software. For cases in which industry standards may differ from
standards set based on technical qualities alone, Langlois further argues that
the creation of a standard may open up the possibility of new entry by
reducing consumer uncertainty. In our own data the adoption of the RCA
broadcast standard for television presents just such a case, and entry does
indeed increase rapidly for a brief period after the adoption of that standard.
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
In summary, we propose that most newly created industries will end
up crystalizing a dominant design. The dominant design will be the result of
a period of technological and market experimentation plus the net effect
other factors such as the distribution of collateral assets among the firms, the
existing industry regulation or other types of government intervention, the
specific strategy followed by each firm, the existence of network externalities
in the industry, and the way each firms manages its user interface.
The period preceding the emergence of a dominant design will be
marked by a significant net entry of firms into the industry. The total number
of firms in the industry will grow to reach a peak at about the time that the
dominant design emerges. The point at which a dominant design is
introduced in the industry is expected to be followed by a rather sharp decline
in the total number of participants until the curve of the total participants
reaches a relatively stable condition with a few firms sharing the market. A
major technological discontinuity would start a whole new cycle again.
We contend that a firm's probability of success will be higher if it enters
the industry before the dominant design. As explained above, the emergence
of a dominant design permits a few firms to raise barriers to entry by
exploiting economies of scale and accumulating collateral assets. Our
proposition regarding entry timing vis a vis the evolution of technology
extends the findings of the literature on entry timing by explicitly
incorporating technology into the analysis.
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SUMMARY OF DATA
In general, each of the eight industries studied here presents a similar
pattern of firms' entry and exit. American firms, usually small
entrepreneurial firms, enter at the dawn of a new industry at a moderate pace.
Later, a rapid wave of entry occurs, raising the slope of the curve of total
number of firms in an industry. This can be seen in Figure 2, which
summarizes such curves for the different industries in this study. After a
dominant design is established, the total number of firms declines steadily
until it reaches a point of stability--a few large firms remaining in the
industry supply most of the demand. Successful firms often enter the
industry early.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
A list of the industries with their respective dominant design dates can
be found in Table 1. Our sample includes both large and relatively small
industries. In terms of total revenue, the automobile and television
industries are the largest. It is interesting to note that the peak in number of
firms in these two industries occurs at a higher level than all other industries.
Larger industries seem to attract more firms. The smallest industry in terms
of revenue, massively parallel supercomputers, shows the smallest number
of firms at its peak. Also, the sample contains industries with both long and
compressed periods of competitive turbulence. Purely mechanical
typewriters exist for nearly 70 years before the electric typewriter appears in
the market. In contrast, transistors, integrated circuits, and supercomputers
are cases in which the competitive turbulence we have observed appears to
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have occurred in a shorter period of time, though the latter two industries
have yet to reach a state of few participants with stable market shares.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
THE TYPEWRITER
According to Engler (1969) the typewriter industry began in 1873 with
the entry of the Remington Arms Company. Their typewriter was a synthesis
of many existing elements. Clockwork suggested the idea of the escapement
(to move the carriage one letter at a time). A telegraph sender provided parts
for the first model for keys and arms. A sewing machine pedal was used for
returning the carriage. The piano contributed the concept of the free and
swinging arms and hammers for imprinting the letters. The industry's initial
growth was slow, and Remington had essentially a monopoly for the first few
years. By 1885, the field had widened to five competitors. A period of rapid
entry followed, and by the early 1890s, 30 firms had been established. Of these,
Underwood and Smith were the principal innovators. Underwood, a
supplier of ribbons and other typewriter materials, entered in 1895. Smith
was a 1903 spin-off from the Remington Union Company with a product
innovation--a visible paper, front strike typewriter-that was incompatible
with the Remington product line.
In 1904 the Royal Typewriter Company, the last of the four firms which
were to dominate the industry, was established. By 1909, almost 40 companies
competed in the typewriter industry (data from Engler 1969). Many others
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which entered and quickly exited, without making any significant
penetration, have been left out of the records. Most of the actively competing
firms were started between 1886 and 1899, forming the sharp wave of entry
hypothesized.
The set of features which was to become the dominant design in the
typewriter industry resulted from a fascinating sequence of major
innovations. In 1899, Underwood introduced the Model 5. The Model 5 had
visible writing, rather than having the page obscured. It was the first to have
a tabulator as part of the typewriter, to be able to cut stencils, and to make
copies. Thus, it did not need expensive attachments to do most of the jobs
encountered in the office and consequently won Underwood a large share of
the market.
During the years following Underwood's introduction of the Model 5,
Edward Hess, a man with exceptional mechanical abilities, perfected many of
the features that were still rough in the Model 5. By rearranging the clutter of
knobs, bars, and ribbon mechanism, he was able to deliver "total,
uncompromised visibility." He reversed the linkage in the typebar action, so
the action was a pull rather than a push, thus saving energy. He removed
much of the friction from the escapement--the toothwheel that links the keys
with the carriage and moves it along one space when a letter is struck. These
and other innovations gave Hess' typewriter a light, fast touch welcomed by
users. Hess received 140 typewriter patents during his lifetime. One of Hess'
major concerns, and one that has direct implication for our model, was to
reduce typewriter production costs by improved design.
After Underwood's Model 5 and Hess' innovations, competition
centered mainly around features and increasingly on production costs. Figure
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3 shows the pattern that our model predicts. The rapid growth in the number
of firms halts in 1899, the same year in which Underwood's Model 5 was
introduced. After 1906, when most of Hess' innovations were in place, the
number of firms in the industry begins an irreversible decline. Incidentally,
Underwood, which had been a major innovator with its Model 5, lagged in
bringing out new developments, and within a decade, had lost its dominant
position to Royal.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The period between 1906-1940 was a period of rapid reduction in the
total number of firms. By 1940, there were only five predominant producers:
IBM and the four traditional firms. According to Engler (1969) each of the
four--Remington, Royal, Smith and Underwood--had 20% of the market,
with IBM having approximately 10%, and others (mostly foreign) 10%. The
efficient size for a single plant was between 10% and 30% of total demand, or
150,000 to 450,000 units per year. Relative costs of production were
substantially higher for a plant below 10% of market share. In summary,
more than 90% of the firms that had entered the industry had disappeared,
either through bankruptcy or, in a few cases, through merger. Only a few
early, innovative entrants had survived.
THE AUTOMOBILE
More than 100 firms entered and participated in the American
automobile industry for a period of five years or longer. The data for this
industry are presented in graphic form in Utterback (1987 based on data from
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Fabris 1966). The wave of entry began in 1894 and continued through 1950,
followed by a wave of exits beginning in 1923 and peaking only a few years
later, although it has continued until the present day. Again, data for many
shorter lived firms or ones which became parts producers or other specialists
are not included. As hypothesized, entry began rather slowly, but then
accelerated rapidly after 1900, with participation in the industry reaching a
peak of 75 participants in 1923. In the next two years, twenty-three firms,
nearly a third of the industry, left or merged, and by 1930, thirty-five firms
had exited. During the ensuing depression, twenty more firms left. There
was a brief flurry of entries and then exits immediately following World War
II, but the number of U. S. firms in the industry has been basically stable since
1940.
The number, and scope, of major product innovations is reflected in
this pattern of entries and exits. 1923, the year with the largest number of
firms, was the year that Dodge introduced the all-steel, closed body
automobile. The large number of exits over the next few years corresponds to
the fact that by 1925, 50% of the United States production was dosed, steel
body cars, and by 1926, 80% of all automobiles were of this type (Abernathy
1978). The post-World War II stability in market shares and number of firms
reflects the fact that approximately three-quarters of the major product
innovations occurred before the start of the War.5
New concepts in product accessories and styling were tested in the low
volume, high profit luxury automobile. Conversely, incremental
innovations were more commonly introduced in lower priced, high volume
product lines. General Motors appears to have led in both types of
innovations, particularly for major product changes. In certain years, engines
show a higher annual magnitude of changes; these changes, however, occur
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with less frequency than do those in chassis characteristics; body plants are
more flexible and continuously changing than are engine plants, which tend
to change occasionally in an integrated and systematic way.
Of firms which produced automobiles for five years or more from 1894
to 1918, 60 firms entered and none exited. We do not have data on
innovations for this period, but we assume that architectural innovations
overwhelmingly predominated. From 1919 to 1929, 22 firms entered and 43
left during this period, 14 of 32 major product changes occurred, nearly half of
the total. From 1930 to 1941, 6 firms entered and 29 exited, and 11 major
innovations occurred. Finally, from 1946 to 1962, 4 firms entered and 8 left,
but only 7 major innovations were introduced. One can see a continual
decline in major product innovations over these three periods (Fabris 1966,
pp. 85-93).
TELEVISION AND TELEVISION TUBES
Research leading to the appearance of television started several of
decades before the first successful results were achieved. RCA entered the
industry in 1929 after Sarnoff, impressed by a demonstration by the inventor
Vladimir Zworykin, decided to hire Zworykin and put him in charge of
RCA's Electronic Research Group in Camden. Several other firms or
inventors-entrepreneurs entered the infant industry during the 1930s, and all
of them contributed to expand the frontier of technical knowledge. Philco,
Philo Farnsworth, Louis Hazeltine, American Television, and Allen DuMont
are some of the most important names.
The commercial birth of the industry can be traced back to the 1939-1940
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New York World's Fair, where millions of Americans saw television displays
for the first time. For the purpose of our analysis, 1939 marks the beginning
of the industry. Our data in Figure 4 start only in 1949; however, the data
clearly show that the television industry conforms to the hypothesized
relationships. The first decade of the industry (the dotted lines are our
estimates of the real curves' shape for that decade) obviously witnessed a
rapid increase in the number of firms. The wave of entry most likely peaks in
1950, the first year of our entry data, or one year earlier. The total number of
firms steadily increased until 1952, the year in which it peaked at 85 firms.
Also, in 1951 the exit wave takes off, to peak around 1956 (Utterback and
Suarez 1993).
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Several things happened in the early 1950s in the television industry
which had a significant impact on the pattern of innovation and competition
that was to follow. First, the uncertainty about technical standards for color
broadcasting (i.e. UHF versus VHF) was finally resolved by the Supreme
Court in 1951. Later, in 1953, the FCC approved the NTSC system, backed by a
group of manufacturers headed by RCA. Several firms which had opposed
the RCA technical standards dropped out of business due to this legal verdict.
Second, several features of the television sets converged to form a dominant
design around 1952. The most important dimension of the dominant design
was the size of the screen, and therefore the characteristics of the picture tube.
The first monochrome set produced by RCA was a 10-inch set. Almost all sets
produced in the 1940s had screens smaller than 14 inches. RCA produced its
first 21-inch set and other large screen sets around 1952, and they soon became
the market standard. Third, during the early 1950s, RCA started to license its
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television technology to other firms, which further reduced competition and
also supports the idea that RCA held rights to most of the key characteristics
of the product at that time.
The story of the TV picture and receiving tubes is undoubtedly related
to that of the television industry itself. Figure 5 depicts a rapid increase in the
total number of tube producers from 1949 to 1956, analogous to that
previously discussed for the television industry. In 1956, four years after the
peak of the television industry's curve, the total number of firms in the tube
industry reaches its peak at 66 firms. The entry wave also peaks around that
time, registering more than 40 entries in the period 1953-1955. The wave of
firms exiting the industry takes off slowly during the early 1950s, and reaches
a peak in 1958, with 15 firms leaving in that year (Utterback and Surez 1993).
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
One of RCA's major achievements was the development of the
shadow mask color picture tube. The FCC ruled in favor of the RCA
compatible color standard on December 17, 1953, and programs were first
broadcast in this format in January of 1954. Hazeltine made major
contributions to brightness in order to make bright whites. Some problems in
manufacture constrained the size of the tubes to 16 inches until CBS
laboratories learned how to curve the mask. RCA licensed both of these
developments. A problem with the initial tubes was that they were metallic
with glass bonded to the front, and this interface proved to be troublesome.
The 21 inch, all-glass picture tube is considered here to be the dominant
design. The 21 inch, all-glass tube (first black and white, then color) was by far
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the biggest seller after the mid-fifties. The first such tube, black and white,
was introduced by RCA late in 1955, and captured a significant portion of the
TV tube market during the rest of that decade. The advent of reliable color
tubes contributed to the difficulties that many tube producers were
experiencing during the late fifties and fostered concentration in the industry.
Indeed, on May 8, 1958, RCA publicly announced the first all-glass 21 inch
color picture tube, which was to hold a large share of the color tube market.6
THE TRANSISTOR
According to Tilton (1971), three firms dominated the receiving tube
business in the United States in 1950: General Electric, Philco Ford and RCA.
Over the ensuing decade, these firms spent more on R&D and received more
patents than did new firms entering the industry (counting the expenditures
and patents of the Bell Laboratories), but a cohort of new entrants gained
nearly two-thirds of the market. By 1966, three of these new entrants--Texas
Instruments, Motorola, and Fairchild Semiconductor-together accounted for
42% of the market, while the vacuum tube manufacturers' share of the
transistor market had declined to just slightly more than one-quarter of the
total. The difference between established and new entrants in the business
would be even more dramatic if one included the IBM's production for its
own use (It is believed to have entered production in 1961).
Figure 6 shows that the total number of firms in the industry starts to
rise rapidly with the announcement of the invention of the transistor in 1948.
The rapid increase in the total number of firms is virtually halted around
1959, the first year in which the planar transistor was in commercial
production. Transistors produced through the planar process rapidly became
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the dominant design in the industry. First introduced by Fairchild
Semiconductors, planar transistors presented many advantages over the older
mesa transistor technology. In particular, the planar transistor was flat, which
meant that electrical connections could be achieved by depositing an
evaporated metal film on appropriate portions of the wafer. This was a great
advantage over the mesa transistor, whose irregular surface dictated that
electrical connections be done laboriously by hand. The planar transistor
prompted a drive for producing low-cost transistors typical of after-dominant-
design stages of the industry cycle. Exits in the industry, almost nil before
1959, become commonplace afterwards. The years 1963 and 1964 saw the
development of epitaxial growth and epitaxial reactors for producing
integrated circuits and further development of process integration. We will
discuss integrated circuits in more detail below as a separate case.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT7
The integrated circuit industry is the only one in our sample that does
not dearly conform to our hypotheses. In fact, Figure 7, displaying only data
on U.S. firms, shows no clear peak in the number of firms in the industry
during the period studied. Therese Flaherty, who is currently studying the
integrated circuit industry, suggests that no one product of any generation can
be easily considered a dominant design. The integrated circuit has kept on
changing substantially from generation to generation, which may explain the
very broad plateau we observe in total industry participation with continuing
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underlying entries and exits.
There are several generations of integrated circuits. For instance,
DRAM, the most important segment of the integrated circuit industry, has
had seven generations up to the present time (1K, 4K, 16K, 64K, 256K, 1MB,
4MB). Competition has been tough both within and between generations.
No one firm has been able to maintain a leadership position from one
generation to another. In general, American firms have been loosing ground
to Japanese entrants. The first two generations were dominated by American
firms; however, starting with the 16K generation, Japanese firms take a
significant share of the market. The industry has grown very rapidly over
time; the first generation (1K) had a maximum annual revenue of 152
million dollars in 1977, while the 256K generation-the last one for which
revenue data are available-reached an annual level of 1,807 million dollars
in 1987. This growth happened in a fifteen-year time span.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
Despite the fact that a quick look at the integrated circuit industry
suggests that our model has limited explanatory power here, we would like to
point out to several issues that cast shadow on such a first-sight conclusion.
To begin with, most of the entries occur during the early years of the industry.
This is especially true for American firms, as can be seen in Figure 7, but it is
also true, to a lesser extent, for Japanese or "foreign" firms.8 Moreover,
"enter early" seems to be a winning strategy within each generation, as
Flaherty has pointed out. Secondly, the production capacity of dominant
firms has been increasing--relative to total market demand-throughout the
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generations. The trend is that fewer companies are increasingly able to satisfy
most of the demand.
Our model hypothesizes a similar increase in industry concentration.
Indeed, it should be noted that exits of American firms from the industry take
off in 1985, increasing steadily for the next two years. As American entries are
nil during this period, the total number of American firms declines in 1987 to
one of its lowest levels. Higher concentration and larger firms is the
prevailing pattern in the industry today. Finally, although product
innovation is still important in later integrated circuit generations, process
innovation and production capabilities are increasingly critical as generations
pass and greater production volumes are required of participant firms. Such
production capabilities form an effective barrier to entry in the industry, and
plant scale and investment costs seem to have steadily increased.
THE ELECTRONIC CALCULATOR
The American calculator industry in the early 1960's consisted of five
major companies manufacturing electromechanical machines that
controlled nearly 90% of the market-Frieden Monroe, Marchant, Victor, and
Olivetti. Frieden, Marchant and Monroe each had approximately 20% of the
market, Victor, a slightly smaller share, and Olivetti 10 to 15%. These
companies were almost completely vertically integrated due to of the need for
a high degree of precision in the manufacture of many specialized parts.
There were strong barriers to entry to new firms. By concentrating on specific
segments of the market, the major companies avoided intense competition.
They also had reinforced their market dominance by setting up extensive
distribution and service networks. In addition, through nearly a century of
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continuing modification and perfection, the technology of electro-mechanical
calculators had reached a high level. Thus, it was not easy for anyone to come
up with a dramatic breakthrough that would threaten the status quo. In its
early years, true to the hypothesized pattern, this industry too displayed a
large number of competitors and a wide variety of designs Martin 1992).
This situation did not change initially when the electronic calculator
entered the market in 1962. The first electronic machines were extremely
complex and expensive having more than 2300 discrete parts, and were aimed
at specialized scientific and technical market segments. Figure 8 shows (with
data from Majumdar 1977) that between 1962-1970, eleven firms entered the
industry, with ten of them surviving. The wave of entry peaked in 1972, with
the entry of twenty-one firms in a three-year period, as shown in the Figure.
However, exits begin in 1971, rising sharply during the next few years. 1971
marks the year of the introduction of the dominant design of the calculator
on a chip, which made the assembly of units extremely simple-merely
piecing together the chip, display device, and keyboard. The entry of
semiconductor manufacturers, such as Texas Instruments and Rockwell in
1972, and National Semiconductor in 1973, further precipitated the departure
of firms which were largely assemblers of purchased components. The
industry's structure then appears to stabilize, with even a few of the
semiconductor makers, such as Rockwell, dropping out, and a small number
of the remaining vertically integrated companies dominating the market.
Thus, the appearance of a dominant design, and the drive toward vertical
integration which often follows its appearance, were almost concurrent in
this highly compressed example.
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FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
WINCHESTER DISC DRIVES
Clayton Christensen (1992) argues persuasively that established firms
failed to master each successive generation of Winchester disc drive
technology through being too wedded to existing customer demands and not
attentive enough to the emerging demands of manufacturers of smaller
computers. Five generations of Winchester drives are described in
Christensen's data: 14 inch drives, 8 inch drives, 5 1/4 inch drives, 3 1/2 inch
drives, and 2 1/2 inch drives. In the first two generations the motor was
separate, while in the third it was incorporated in the drive spindle. Further
important design changes were made in the 3 1/2 inch drives, while the 2 1/2
inch drives are essentially a miniature version of the 3 1/2 inch drives and
have not to date enjoyed important sales growth.
Established firms were the real leaders in introducing thin film disc
drives, which displaced the own magnetic technologies. Most of the new
entrants failed in this discontinuity. (This dovetails nicely with McCormack
and Utterbacks' (1993) fiber optics data.) Likewise with the thin film head
IBM spent $300 million to develop thin film disc drives, while DEC spent
$200 million. On the other hand new entrants were the leaders in
introducing new architectures, that is in Henderson and Clarks' (1990) terms
assemblies of existing components related in different ways. Conversely,
while established firms led the difficult but incremental improvement of
components, new firms led with new architectures using established
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components. The leaders in thin film disc drives were not able to keep that
proprietary. This did not affect industry structure or market shares despite its
high cost. Leaders in architectural change, despite its being fast and cheap,
dethroned the leading companies in the Winchester drive industry.
Why are firms willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars for
incremental changes and not a few millions for a new frame size? Perhaps
because the new frame size did not address the needs of their established
customers. Smaller drives at first were much slower and more expensive,
but they did enable a hard drive on the desk top. The data summarized in
Figure 9 when examined in detail show that the leaders in each new
generation of drives were different from those that headed the list in the
prior generation, with the exception of the current 2 1/2 inch drives.
Christensen claims that the 3 1/2 inch drives incorporate all the the features
and functions that will be seen in 2 1/2 inch and even smaller drives, and
thus constitute a dominant design. This is a pleasing conclusion since it
perfectly supports our hypothesis as shown by our independent analysis of his
data in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
Today yet another revolution in technology is waiting in the wings in
the form of so-called "flash memories." These are credit card sized
semiconductor memories that hold as much data as did the early generation
Winchester drives without requiring moving parts. They currently cost
several times the amount that one would spend for a more capacious disc
drives, but they are being designed into lap top computers. Drive makers
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have countered defensively by introducing modular and interchangeable disc
drives, and so history repeats itself.
SUPERCOMPUTERS
Supercomputers, i.e. the most powerful computational systems at any
given time, today achieve speeds in the 100 MFLOPS (Million Floating Point
Operations per Second) range. Three major technologies have been used to
build supercomputers: sequential, vector, and parallel processing. Sequential
computers, whose architecture is often referred as to von Neumann, have
only one central processing unit (CPU); they do one thing at a time. Vector
processors allow simultaneous computation for some problems, such as
problems with vector-like or matrix-like structure. Parallel processing, or
more specifically massively parallel processing, is a computer architecture in
which hundreds or thousands of processors are put on many jobs
simultaneously to get the job done faster than more traditional
supercomputers and with greater generality. This however requires wholly
new software - a problem of collateral assets.
Traditional supercomputer makers-such as Cray, Fujitsu, Hitachi,
IBM, and NEC--produce mostly von Neumann machines with some having
vector processors to boost performance. IBM and Univac are considered the
first entrants into the supercomputer industry. Cray Research entered in 1972
to become the presently dominant player in sequential supercomputers. A
second set of firms, minisupercomputer makers, use the von Neumann
architecture with the associated incremental innovations of pipelining and
vector processing, but build less powerful machines which target low-end
applications with price-sensitive customers. Massively parallel computer
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(MPC) makers are the latest entrants in the supercomputer industry, as
shown in Figure 10. Firms such as Thinking Machines, Intel, Floating Point
Systems, and Meiko started production around 1985, while the MPC
"pioneers" Ametek, Myrias, and Goodyear Aerospace entered the industry
only as far back as 1983 (data from Afuah and Utterback 1992).
FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE
There are two issues of interest in the supercomputer industry in the
light of our hypotheses. First, at a more aggregate level, we suggest that the
massively parallel architecture will become the dominant design in
supercomputers. Therefore, it is likely that we see some exit of traditional
firms from the industry in the future, and large players such as IBM or Cray
turning to the MPC architecture. Second, although numerous MPC designs
exist today, Afuah and Utterback (1992) forecast that some variation of the
hypercube configuration will prevail, because it seems to be the only easily
scaleable design.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Nearly all these examples point to the hypothesis that entering early is
the most viable strategy for a firm. Clearly, it is each wave of radical product
change that brings with it the entry of new firms-either small, technology-
based enterprises or large firms carrying their technical skills into the new
product and market area-and it is these firms which later dominate the
restructured industry.
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Bearing in mind that the data reviewed here are derived essentially
from U.S. firms producing assembled products, the appearance of a dominant
design does indeed seem to shift emphasis in an industry from
predominantly entrepreneurial product innovation toward process
development, scale of production, production management techniques,
elaborate research programs aimed at planned incremental change, and
correspondingly to advantages for larger firms. The dominant design which
emerges is not necessarily the result solely of technical potentials, but also of
timing, collateral assets and other circumstances. Once a degree of
standardization is accepted, however, major innovations from within an
industry seem less and less likely to occur short of a wave of new entrants and
increasing competition.
Strategies for entry, development, and resource allocation should, we
believe, bear a relationship to the current state of the technical development
of an industry's product and process, as well as the degree to which these are
integrated. Counter strategies are likely to be highly risky, and thus should be
thought out with great care. While the process described is not necessarily
irreversible, the evidence to date indicates that it is highly directional.
Surviving to become a dominant firm is an improbable event (the outcome
for only 5-10% of U.S. entrants in the cases examined) doubtless requiring
superb execution of product design, process development and organization,
and fortunate timing in what is at least initially a highly uncertain
environment.
Failures of firms in our analysis seem to be a matter of weakness of
technical resources or slowness in development, or to stem from lack of
knowledge of emerging markets, not simply of lack of scale or market power.
Utterback and Suarez July 30, 1993 35
Thus, mergers of weaker firms are most often seen in the cases above to be
followed by failure. Few of the mergers noted during the waves of exit shown
above appear to be truly complementary ones which extend product lines and
markets. Normally in the cases studied, mergers which occur after a
dominant design appears quickly fail. The pattern shown by the emerging
dominant firms appears to be one of growing internal technological and
manufacturing strength and of knowledge of emerging markets, rather than
one of successive mergers with competitors. Development of close and
technically creative supplier relationships appear to be keys to successful,
continuing dominance in many cases. There is also the potential that such
closed relationships may result in even more rigidity and resistance to change
by entrenched firms (Amburgey, Kelly and Burnett, 1993).
There is suggestive evidence both in the literature and in the cases
examined to infer that product performance and cost are strongly related to
entry, exit and growth of competing firms. In particular, performance
improvement seems to reach a maximum as firms pour into an industry
during its formative or architectural period, prior to the dominant design.
Klein (1977) has shown this to be true in the case of autos and aircraft engines.
Modis and Debecker (1988) dearly demonstrate that periods of greatest
improvement in the performance of microcomputers correspond to waves of
newly entering firms. Conversely, cost reduction may reach a maximum as
firms struggle for dominance during the time of most rapid exit from an
industry. The peak period of exits is a period of rapid revenue growth both
for the industry as a whole, and especially for the emerging dominant firms
as they increase their scale of operations. These are important questions
bearing centrally on issues of technology strategy. They may be well worth
the effort needed to gather data in greater detail on firms' market shares,
product performance and costs where possible.
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The summary curves of industry participation in Figure 2 show
striking differences in the total numbers of firms entering different
industries. Does the total number of firms vary with the size of the market
for each product? It seems reasonable that the total markets for autos,
televisions and tubes, and typewriters are larger than those at any
corresponding point in development for calculators or supercomputers.
Does a rather flat summit or plateau in total industry participation, as
is the case for typewriters and integrated circuits, reflect either continuing
technological change in a product or many rapidly succeeding generations?
Conversely, does the sharpness of a peak in total industry participation reflect
strong economies of scale as in autos and calculators, and complementary
assets such as software written or a particular architecture, as in the case of
supercomputers? Can we infer the occurrence of a dominant design from the
occurrence of a peak in participation and the beginnings of consolidation in
an industry? This certainly seems to be the case for massively parallel
supercomputers, as Afuah and Utterback (1992) have predicted.
If our conclusions are correct when more generally examined and
tested, then any action based on a static analysis of a firm's strengths and
strategy will probably reduce that firm's chances for long run survival, much
as highly specialized animals fail to survive slight shifts in climate and
habitat while generalized foragers prosper. This is the more strikingly clear if
a firm has as its ambition surviving a generational shift in technology. Most
firms fail to survive, at least as players in a particular product arena, even in
the competitive shake out seemingly precipitated by the synthesis of a
dominant product design. The number able to survive a generational shift is
apparently vanishingly small. The patterns observed here dearly imply that a
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firm should suboptimize in the short term in order to build the flexibility,
skills, and resources it will almost surely need if it is to become a dominant
survivor in the longer term (Utterback and Kim, 1983, Gersik, 1991).
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
The earlier Abernathy and Utterback (1978) work implies that it is
theoretically possible for a firm to enter a product market segment at any stage
simply by stressing different capabilities and using different strategies. For
example, a new entrant in the fluid state as they define it might succeed by
stressing a high degree of product innovation. An entrant in the transition
state might succeed by stressing process innovation and process integration.
Finally, a new entrant in the specific state might succeed by having financial
strength and investing in a plant at the most economic scale and location.
Although entry at any state is theoretically possible, most of the
examples provided above point to the conclusion that entering early is the
most viable strategy for an American firm. Entering at later stages has proven
to be a much riskier strategy, less likely to succeed (Suarez and Utterback
1993). However, the successful entry of large and highly integrated Japanese
firms after a dominant design has emerged in some of our examples
apparently contradicts our findings. Indeed, post-dominant design entry
seems to have been the strategy of choice for most Japanese firms. As Harvey
Brooks writes "the typical pattern of Japanese success has been rapid
penetration of a narrow, but carefully selected segment of broad, expanding
world market in which superiority in production efficiency, economies of
scale, and exploitation of learning curve effects were particularly
important ....... Japan has been able to capture an important share of the market
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for selected products just behind the current technological frontier."9
Figure 11 shows the pattern we describe. In the figure, data for total
participation of Japanese firms are shown for the cases of automobiles,
television sets, electronic calculators, integrated circuits and Winchester disc
drives respectively. The Figure also indicates the date in which a dominant
design emerged in the U.S. for each industry considered.
FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE
For three of the products in question, autos, televisions and integrated
circuits the pattern in Japan is completely different than that in the United
States shown earlier in this chapter. The number of active firms in Japan
shows an slow but constant growth over the entirety of the periods studied.
This growth is generally the result of steady, relentless entry with almost no
exit of firms from each industry once established. Note also from Figure 11
that in three of four cases, the peak in Japanese entry occurs after the
emergence of a dominant design in the U.S.
The two most recent products for which we have data are more similar
to the U. S. case than are the earlier three. Both electronic calculators and
Winchester drives exhibit a distinct peak, and both are lower than the U. S.
peak for the same industry. The Winchester drive peak occurs slightly later
than the 1983 peak in the U.S. as expected, but the Japanese peak in the
calculator case is actually two or three years earlier than that in the U. S.10
Note also that, unlike the other three cases, Japanese firms enter the industry
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in these two cases at about the same time as their U.S. counterparts. Finally,
with the sole exception of Winchester drives, there are more Japanese
competitors than American at the end of the game, the result not of more
Japanese entrants, but rather of much greater frequencies of American firms
moving out of the competitive arena, while relatively few Japanese firms
ever leave. Japanese entrants tend to be larger firms and conglomerates,
which tend to have more collateral assets, and which are more persistent
than U. S. firms, many of which will be smaller new entrants.
There are two main issues to highlight when comparing the U.S. and
Japanese patterns. First, the successful post-dominant design entry by
Japanese firms observed in autos, televisions and integrated circuits can be
explained by our theory, and therefore it does not necessarily contradict our
earlier findings. Second, there seems to be a tendency for Japanese firms in
more contemporary industries (such as Winchester disks and electronic
calculators) to enter as early as their American counterparts. This emergent
pattern makes us think that our findings for American firms will begin to be
replicated by research on contemporary Japanese data.
Successful post-dominant design entry does not contradict the
postulates of our theory. If our propositions are correct, then to succeed, post-
dominant design entrants must necessarily follow a consistent strategy, i.e.
focus on mastering their production capabilities. This seems to be in line
with what the Japanese late entrants have done. The Japanese examples in
autos, televisions and integrated circuits complement our U.S. data and show
that productive units can pursue widely different strategies as long as their
strategy is matched to the state of evolution of the technology. With Japan's
rising affluence and large current investments in research, technology and
plant and equipment, and with the U.S. awakening to the need of
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manufacturing excellence, one might expect, as does Ohmae (1985), that the
pattern in Japan will more and more closely resemble that of the United
States as time passes. If this is the case-as our limited data suggests-then pre-
dominant design entry may still prove to be the strategy of choice in the
future even for Japanese firms. This is an interesting issue which dearly
deserves much further study.
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
What are some of the broader questions raised by cases and
comparisons presented above? The first issue relates to cases in which our
theory apparently does not apply. In particular, What happens when a
dominant design seems not to occur? For example, the personal computer
market is shared by several seemingly incompatible or partially compatible
designs including Apple's MacIntosh, IBM's personal computer, inexpensive
work stations made by Sun and others. In this case focussing on the hardware
alone may simply lead one astray from recognizing a possible dominant
design. According to George White, "the IBM PC is not the key. The key is
the Intel 8088 order code and the Microsoft operating system and 'Windows'
which effectively emulates the MacIntosh. The Intel 486 chip using MS/DOS
and windows linked to a laser printer as an ensemble essentially constitutes a
dominant design. Companies that push beyond that configuration will
probably find that they will not appeal to a larger group of customers."11 As
noted above, Langlois comes to a similar conclusion stressing that, "a
dominant design emerges as a result of both technological and market
learning."12
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White further notes that the dominant design in a particular product
can break down, broadly considered, without the occurrence of significant
technological change in the product. For example, as documented by
Womack, Jones and Roos (1992), the "lean" production system pioneered by
Toyota, led not only to greater flexibility in production processes, but also to
greater flexibility in product design, all without changing the basic
technological paradigm of the automobile. This has led to a degree of
competitive turbulence in the industry characteristic of an earlier period,
though not to increased entry. Wheelwright and Clark (1993) have suggested
that the ability of Japanese automakers to accommodate frequent though
small changes will allow them to outpace firms that intend to introduce
fewer but larger technological changes even when such changes are of a more
radical nature. This certainly seems to be the case currently in their use of
lighter weight materials. And a lighter automotive structure will be a
prerequisite either to much more fuel efficient autos, or in the longer term to
a successful electric vehicle.
Similarly, the television business is going through a dissolution now,
high definition television notwithstanding. The current television receiver
is still widely accepted, but the network model of broadcasting organization
pioneered in the days of radio is simply vanishing under the onslaught of
new organizational forms and systems for distributing programs. "Prime
time" has become a less valuable commodity, while new methods of storage
and distribution of programming have proliferated and programming
content and viewing audiences have become far less predictable. Some
markets will soon have literally hundreds of channels as well as movies
distributed on demand in addition to videotape and videodisc distribution.
One might even speculate that such a proliferation of services will be the
catalyst that will make high definition television desirable to a large enough
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segment of the market to enable its advance.
Another important issue relates to the identification of a dominant
design. It is clear that attempting to define or anticipate the appearance of a
so called dominant design simply by mapping features and functions of the
product alone is doomed to frustration. The foregoing arguments dearly
indicate that the emergence of a dominant design is also strongly influenced
by firms' possession of collateral assets, by government regulation and
intervention especially around standards setting, by strategic maneuvering at
the firm level and by interactions between users and producers. For example,
in the case of the typewriter the widespread acceptance of the QWERTY
keyboard was a result not only of the technical factors described in the case,
but also of the invention of touch typing by a typing instructor. Touch typing
greatly increased typing speeds reinforcing both the acceptance of the
typewriter as a tool and the primacy of the Underwood Model 5 and
QWERTY on which it was based. With that change the limiting factor
became the human condition - the stock of widespread typing skills centered
on a specific machine configuration. Thus, QWERTY has stayed unchanged
through generations of product technology: electric typewriters, hardware
based word processors and today personal computers. Neither the Dvorak
keyboard representing a small advance over QWERTY, or various chorded
keyboard designs representing potentially much greater advances have made
any significant inroads in the market. However, many chorded commands
and functions are being imbedded within the standard keyboard to take
advantage of the power and flexibility of the personal computer and its
software.
White suggests that the idea of dominant designs can best be
understood in terms of information economies. Thus classical mass
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production can be understood as an attempt to embed information
concerning best manufacturing practice in, for example, a set of dies and
fixtures. Today there is less and less reason why all cars must be the same
stemming purely from information economies. If that is true then the
determination of what is or is not a dominant design will increasingly shift
from the producer to the user interface. 13 A fruitful direction of work may be
to analyze a few industries in depth to create and test multi-variate models of
factors such as market factors, collateral assets, regulatory factors, network
externalities, and so on related to firms' survival and success, with the
crystallization of a dominant design being one factor among many
(Christensen, Suirez and Utterback, forthcoming, Carroll 1993).
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Table 1. A List of Dominant Designs By Industry
Industry Dominant Design Date Source
Typewriter
Automobile
Television
TV Tubes
Underwood's Model 5;
Hess's innovations
All Steel, Closed body
21-inch set; adoption of
RCA's technical standards
All-glass, 21 inch tube
Transistor Planar Transistor
Integrated Circuit
Electronic Calculator
Winchester Drives
Supercomputers
1906
1923
1952
1956
1959
Multiple designs in
rapid succession
Calculator on a chip
3 1/2 Inch Drive
1971
1983
D.D. not yet identified,
but we speculate it will
be a variant of the
hypercube architecture
Engler, 1969
Fabris, 1966;
Abernathy 1978
John Rydz; Televisic
Factbook 1949-89
John Rydz; Televisic
Factbook 1 949-89
Tilton, 1971; Braun
& MacDonald, 1978
Dataquest; Flaherty
Majumdar, 1977
Christensen, 1992
Afuah & Utterback,
1990
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Figure 1. Design hierarchies and dominant designs.
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